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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a) (2006).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue presented: Whether the arresting deputy's statement that "if it were
him he would not submit to the chemical test" unfairly influenced the decision to
refuse and renders that refusal involuntary.
Standard of Review: "[W]e review the trial court's conclusions of law under
a correction-of-error standard." Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 5875 589
(Utah Ct.App. 1990).

RELEVANT PORTIONS OF TEXTS OF STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (2006) - located in its entirety at Addendum A

IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GENE DECKER,
L

Petitioi ier« i\ppellai it

•

\l T

vs.
Case No. 20070210-CA
NANNETTE ROLFE,
Respondent Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case came before the trial court for a trial de novo on an administrative
appeal from the Driver's License Division on August 31, 2006. R 78. At the trial de
novo the respondent presented the testimony of the law enforcement officer to meet its
burden and to justify the arrest for DUI and the subsequent suspension ui un :river's
license based on a refusal to take the breath test requested by the officer.
1\ lr. I )ecker urged the trial court to reverse the finding of the administrative agency
and to reinstate the driver's license of Mr. Decker as the reqi testing officer I iii nself had
advised Mr. Decker that if it were him, he would not submit to the test.
The driver's license revocation was upheld by order of the trial court on February
9,2007 nnilllii^appcil lnll..\^'d

K. 58-62. -

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On May 21, 2006, Gene Decker was involved in a rollover accident at
approximately 9500 West and Butterfield Canyon Road. R. 78 at 4. Deputy Steve
Marshall of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office responded to the dispatch call. R. 78
at 4-5. Deputy Marshall has been an officer for eleven years and over those eleven years
has investigated only 20 to 30 DUI cases. R. 78 at 4. On arriving at the scene, the
deputy observed Gene Decker with a head injury, detected the odor of alcohol from Mr.
Decker, permitted the EMTs to attend to Mr. Decker, conducted field sobriety tests and
arrested Mr. Decker for DUI with Injury. R. 78 at 5-12.
While transporting Mr. Decker from the scene to the Special Operations Division
of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Deputy Marshall—during that one hour time
frame—engaged in several conversations with Mr. Decker. R78 at 13-14, 55. Mr.
Decker was handcuffed at the time and sitting in the front passenger seat of the deputy's
vehicle. T. 78 at 61. The Deputy testified that during that hour trip he spoke very
honestly with Mr. Decker regarding all aspects of the situation. R. 78 at 15. Mr. Decker,
among other things, inquired of the deputy whether he should take the breath test on
arrival at the station. R. 78 at 13-14, 55. The Deputy testified on direct examination that
initially he would not respond to Mr. Decker indicating he should not give him answers
because they could be considered advice. R. 78 at 13. He said Mr. Decker clarified that
2

u_ R. 78 ai 13. The Deputy further testified that Mr. Decker told him he would consider
all of the aspects from the information the Deputy provided to him in making up his own
iiiini: 1 R 78; H 1 1
Deputy Marshall testified that he told Mr. Decker, "I, personally, would not
submit to a chemical test." R. 78 at 14. The Deputy further indicated that he additionally
discussed whal \uniM hap]nil il'lu: ilidn'l laki tin- test ainl llial hi> opinion was not legal
advice, just his own personal opinion. R. 78 at 15. on arrival at the station and once
asked to provide the test, Mr. Decker elected not to take the requested test, R. 78 at 15.
I\ !i Decker'"'s testin 101 ly ii idicated he relied 100 °A » oi i that opinion iron i the Deputy
Marshall. R.78 at 69-70. He also testified that he relied on the Deputy's experience and
knowledge as a police officer to assess whether he should follow his opinion. R 78 at
70.
1 he Deputy subsequently read, verbatim the admoi litioi is oi I tl le DI II forn I tc > Mi
Decker. R. 78 at 16

He also followed up the reading of the admonitions by further

explaining the options to Mr. Decker in an effort to make sure that that was his decision
and that he felt tl lat he was r :•. > * .

:i d-e;;--• •*• »•

17.

On cross-examination the Deputy acknowledged that his personal opinion and
statement "If it were me, I wouldn't take the test," could influence Mr. Decker's decision
whether to take tl le test

R 78 at 57-58 I- le fi irther explaii led 1:1 lat the discussion

regarding the consequences of taking, or not taking the test, included that taking the test
3

was good for law enforcement because it is good for evidentiary purposes. T. 78 at 5960. He additional told Mr. Decker that if he didn't take the test "that he would be
suspended, in all likelihood." T. 78 at 60.
The trial court signed findings of facts and conclusions of law which stated that
"Deputy Marshall's statements regarding his personal opinion did not have any legal
effect on Petitioner's refusal to take the breath test" and that "Petitioner clearly made an
informed and voluntary decision to not take the breath test." R. 61.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Deputy Marshall's statement that if it was him, he would not take the breath test,
operated to impermissibly influence Mr. Decker against taking the requested
chemical/breath test. Mr. Decker's refusal was not voluntary and should not be
countenanced. The trial court was in error in finding Mr. Decker's refusal to be
voluntary and in denying his petition to reinstate the driver's license. See Addendum B
for a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

4

ARGUMENT
THE DEPUTY'S STATEMENT TO THE ARRESTEE THAT "IF IT
WERE HIM HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL TEST"
RENDERS THE SUBSEQUENT REFUSAL AS INVOLUNTARY
AND REQUIRES REINSTATEMENT OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE.

Utah's implied consent law requires that motorists arrested for DUI must be
asked * *• lietl it: i tl ley \ /ill si ibi nit to a chemical test for ak

-.i*

•. .

\.J Ann. §

41-6a-520 (2006). An arresting officer has the duty to properly advise a driver as to his
rights and the potential consequences with regard to the officer's request that he submit to
a chei i ileal test. I Jtal i • : 01 n ts must determine A .>-. •. ...• 'he office! pi ovided v\rai i lings '"that
a person of reasonable intelligence, who is in command of his senses, would
understand.'" Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (quoting Muir v. Cox,
2d 3 84, 3 —

.

ORW f Stewart, J., concurring)).

The arrestee in a DUI, therefore, has the choice to take the requested test or to
refuse the test and lose his driver's license privilege for a period of 18 or 24 months. The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that states may permissibly provide such a choice
where an accused refuses to take a test lawfully requested b

l

- officer.

»est to

take a test itself is not coercive.
We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a bloodalcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the
criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices.
See, e.g., Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183.
213-217,91 S.Ct 1454, 1470-1472. 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). We hold, therefore,
that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully

5

requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination.
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 922-23 (1983).
Our Utah Supreme Court has noted:
There is no mysterious meaning to the word 'refusal.' In the context of the
implied consent law, it simply means that an arrestee, after having been requested
to take the breathalyzer test, declines to do so of his own volition. Whether the
declination is accomplished by verbally saying, 'I refuse', or by remaining silent
and just not breathing or blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing some sort of
qualified or conditional consent or refusal, does not make any difference. The
volitional failure to do what is necessary in order that the test can be performed
is a refusal.
Clearly the loss of driving privileges is a severe deprivation that may have serious
consequences for an individual, not the least of which is the possible loss of
employment. Accordingly, it is important that a law enforcement officer make a
determination that a motorist has refused to take a test on the basis of conduct
which clearly indicates a volitional refusal with an understanding of the
consequences that follow upon a refusal.
State v. Beck, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979)(emphasis added). While requesting the test is
not coercive, the manner or circumstances of the request may be coercive.
In Beck, the Court discussed an Idaho case where the arrestee had been injured
and was in a dazed state when requested to provide a test. The silence which followed
the request did not permit a finding of a voluntary refusal to the request to submit to a
test. Mills v. Swanson, 460 P.2d 704 (Idaho 1969). The Beck Court cautioned: "We
emphasize however that the question as to what constitutes a refusal to take the test must
depend on the circumstances." Beck, 597 P.2d at 1339, quoting Mills, 460 P.2d at 706.
In Beck the arrestee's claim of confusion was rejected and the trial court was reversed

6

because the officer had clearly read the arrestee the admonition twice and the confusion
came from the arrestee's own misunderstanding and reliance on his misunderstanding of
the state law from California. Id.
In a similar case, another Utah arrestee complained that his refusal to submit to the
test was invalid due to the inherent inconsistencies relating to attorney presence when the
implied consent warning and the Miranda warning are contemporaneously given. Muir v.
Cox, 611 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1980). The Muir Court rejected that claim based on the
fact that this arrestee relied on a previous discussion with an attorney who indicated what
he should do when asked to consent to a police search. Id.
In yet another matter, a Utah arrestee contended that, having been read his
Miranda rights at nearly the same time as having been asked to take a chemical test
without having the advice of counsel, confused him as to his legal rights which amounted
to reasonable grounds for refusing the test. The Court disagreed and held that "the
Miranda warning and the Implied Consent Law are not inconsistent, but cautioned that
each proposition must be stated fully, clearly and understandably so that the driver
understands that his affirmative duty to take a chemical test is not obviated by the
Miranda warning." Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979) The Court also
instructed that the question of whether the motorist was confused and whether he
manifested his confusion to the arresting officer is for the trier of fact to determine. Id. at
1334. The case was remanded to the trial court for such a determination. Id.
7

Here, in this case a Bar, however, a different set of circumstances requires this
Court to analyze, and accept, the claim that an arrestee's refusal requires invalidation.
Mr. Decker, while not so dazed as to not understand the admonition given by the
Deputy, was more than confused by the admonition; he was expressly informed by the
officer that if he (the Deputy) was in the position of the arrestee (Mr. Decker) that he (the
Deputy) would refuse to take the test requested by law enforcement. While the Deputy,
then later, did request him to take the test, Mr. Decker refused consistent with the
explanation the officer had earlier provided. The deputy had explained to Mr. Decker
while conversing during the hour trip into the station from the arrest site that the tests
provide evidentiary benefits to law enforcement. R. 78 at 59-60.
The analysis proposed by Mr. Decker presents an issue of first impression in Utah
yet receives support from those cases which analyze the critical element of voluntariness
in other situations. Due process considerations are implicated. Utah Courts have
consistently held that the right to drive is a valuable right or privilege which cannot be
taken away without due process. See Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P. 2d
1302 (Utah 1979); Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Utah.App. 1999). In Holman v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 1979), the Court stated, "Fairness and due process
require that a person threatened with the loss of his driver's license should be afforded an
opportunity to make a choice based on a fair explanation of his rights and duties."

8

Additionally, Fifth Amendment/Miranda jurisprudence instructs, like our cases
cited above, that informed and volitional acts are required to support waivers of the right
to silence or the right to an attorney.
"[T]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to
prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person
asserting the privilege." This coercion requirement comes directly from the
constitutional language directing that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (emphasis
added). And as Professor Levy concluded in his history of the privilege, u[t]he
element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the right
and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories." W.
Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328 (1968).
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) quoting Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 397 (1976). The Neville Court then made the Fifth Amendment connection to
the DUI informed consent cases.
Similarly, Schmerber cautioned that the Fifth Amendment may bar the use of
testimony obtained when the proffered alternative was to submit to a test so
painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost
inevitably a person would prefer "confession." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9.
Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)(unless compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice).
Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
I
Notably, our courts also have used the two substantive legal areas to analyze and
resolve issues of refusal/implied consent jurisprudence. In Utah, to guard against officer
coercion and assure voluntariness of the refusal, controlling case law—in similar fashion
to equivocal requests for counsel—requires that an officer is only permitted to clarify the
9

request or question from the arrestee. If the officer exceeds the clarification duty, again
due process considerations are implicated. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979)(
When driver manifests to officer that he does not understand his duty under implied
consent law in light of the Miranda warning, officer has the responsibility to clarify
driver's rights and responsibilities.).1
In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), this Court discussed at
length the clarification approach to inquiries from a custodial suspect. Within the
Sampson decision this Court cited with approval an Alaska case that provides insight to
our situation now at Bar. When Alaska defendant Hampel made an equivocal request for
counsel, the officer did not clarify the issue. Rather, like our deputy here, he exceeded his
role and provided information beyond clarification which rendered involuntary and
unusable the subsequent waiver and admissions of Hampel. The Court discussed the
issue as follows:
In the present case, it is clear that the interrogating troopers did not seek merely to
clarify Hampers requests about obtaining an attorney before pressing on with the
interrogation. After informing Hampel of his right to an attorney, Lieutenant
Lucking proceeded to emphasize the obstacles to obtaining one. Lucking then
expounded at length on the complexities of the criminal justice system, ultimately
focusing on the evidence incriminating to Hampel. He told Hampel that the gun
had been found in the car he was driving and that his boots matched tracks found
1

In Neville the Court also discussed the fundamental unfairness (or due process rights) of
implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using
his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Citing Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). And while the Court concluded no due process violation on
those facts, the import of entertaining the issue on these comparable legal subjects is both
noteworthy and supportive here.
10

near Music's body. Lucking's talk was purportedly intended to assist Hampel in
deciding whether to exercise his fifth amendment rights (emphasis added):
Lucking: ... I'm trying to give you as much information as I can so that you
can make an intelligent decision as to what you have to do. There's a lot of
evidence against you. A lot of evidence against you and what I'm trying to
stop now is probably be tomorrow and subsequent and it's time and that's
okay.
But the obvious effect of the discourse was to emphasize that Hampel would
damage his case if he delayed talking until an attorney could be present. Lucking
further told Hampel that an attorney probably could not be obtained until the next
day and his friends were being interviewed that night:

We recognize that Lucking's statements were made in response to direct questions
posed by Hampel (emphasis added), and we think it appropriate to emphasize that
nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that the police should feel
constrained in responding to questions posed by the accused in the course of an
interrogation. We further emphasize that, where the accused asks a question that
contains an ambiguous or equivocal reference to the availability of counsel, an
interrogating officer must be given considerable latitude in formulating a
reasonable and responsive answer; in gauging the reasonableness of a specific
answer, due regard must be given to the pressures under which it was formulated,
and full account must be taken of the understandable limitations on the scope of
legal expertise that can reasonably be expected under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the need to avoid any undue influence or coercive effect on the
accused's right to request the presence of counsel during an interrogation makes it
imperative that certain limits be placed on the manner in which ambiguous or
equivocal questions concerning the availability of counsel may be answered. We
believe those limits are exceeded when an interrogating officer chooses to answer
a question in a way which the officer knows or should know will be reasonably
likely to discourage the accused from asserting the right to counsel.—
FN7. We emphasize that the standard we adopt is an objective one, and
does not depend on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer. Cf
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(19801 cert, denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S.Ct. 1980, 72 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982^1
(adopting an analogous standard for determining whether "interrogation"
has occurred). It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether, in this case,
11

Lieutenant Lucking actually intended to discourage Hampel from
requesting an attorney, and we express no view on the question. We further
believe it important to draw a distinction between the manner in which an
interrogating officer chooses to formulate a response and the substance of
the response itself. Nothing in our opinion is intended to suggest that an
interrogating officer would commit any impropriety or otherwise be
precluded from answering a question by the accused directly calling for a
response containing substantive information likely to discourage exercise of
the right to counsel. We deal in this case only with the manner in which a
response is articulated and, to that extent, with substantive information
included in the response which is not directly called for by the accused's
questions. We believe it clear from the record that, in this case, Hampel's
questions did not reasonably call for a speculative elaboration of the
potential difficulties that might be faced in attempting to obtain counsel;
nor do the questions seek to elicit a detailed review dealing with the timing
and progress of the investigation.
Statev, Hampel, 706 P.2d 1173, 11 -1181 (Alaska 1985).2 The Alaska court cited to
other state and federal decisions supporting its conclusions. Id. at 1182. At end, the
Alaska court found the lower court's decision to accept the waiver was in error as not
voluntarily given. Id. at 1181. Mr. Decker's situation is substantially similar to that of
Hample. While the obvious odd difference exists that the deputy here urged refusal, an
atypical law enforcement position, the result was the same. Mr. Decker relied 100% on
the deputy's experienced and knowledgeable statement and he refused the test, losing an
important possession of the driver's license. The Hampel statements were ruled
involuntary; this Court should similarly find that Mr. Decker's refusal was not voluntarily
provided and order the district court to reinstate his driver's license.

2

Appellant apologizes for the lengthy citation but insists the comparison is uncanny and
helpful to the analysis of the issue presented.
12

CONCLUSION

Because the deputy inappropriately influenced Mr. Decker's decision, failing in
his obligation to only clarify the request and opting instead to tell him what he would do
in the situation, this Court should find Mr. Decker's refusal to be improperly given.
For all or any of the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the district court
order denying Mr. Decker's requested relief to reinstate the driver's license and remand
with an order for the lower court to do just that
DATED this,?*? day of June, 2007.

JASON A. SCHATZ
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

§ 41-6a-520. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug-Number of
tests-Refusal-Warning, report

(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given
the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine,
or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person was operating or
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while:
(i) having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section
41-6a-502, 41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232;
(ii) under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug under Section 41-6a-502; or
(iii) having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-517.
(b) A test or tests authorized under this Subsection (1) must be administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while in violation of any
provision under Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (iii).
(c)(i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how
many of them are administered.
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or
more requested tests, even though the person does submit to any other requested
test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(d)(i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical
test or tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not select the
test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical
test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a
defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
(2)(a) A peace officer requesting a test or tests shall warn a person that refusal to
submit to the test or tests may result in revocation of the person's license to operate
a motor vehicle , a five or ten-year prohibition of driving with any measurable or
detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body depending on the person's prior
driving history, and a three-year prohibition of driving without an ignition
interlock device if the person:
(i) has been placed under arrest;
(ii) has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the
chemical tests under Subsection (1); and
(iii) refuses to submit to any chemical test requested.

(b)(i) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License Division and
within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License Division's intention
to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle,
(ii) When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver License
Division, the peace officer shall:
(A) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(B) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of
arrest; and
(C) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License Division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License
Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by
the Driver License Division, also serve as the temporary license certificate.
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within
ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under Subsection
(2)(b), that:
(i) the peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested person was in violation of
any provision under Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (iii); and
(ii) the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection

(i).
(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests
shall be made available to the person.

(4)(a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a physician
of the person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility
of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
(5) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests,
the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an
attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the taking of any
test.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GENE DECKER,
Petitioner,
vs.

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

:

NANNETTE ROLFE, Bureau Chief
Driver Control Bureau, Driver License
Division, Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

:
Case No. 060911537 AA
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for a trial de novo on August 31, 2006,
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Petitioner and his counsel Jason Schatz
appeared. Respondent appeared through counsel Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney
General. The Court, having heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and
arguments presented at the hearing, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause

appearing, enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 21, 2006, Petitioner was involved in a accident in Butterfield Canyon.

Deputy Marshall arrived at the location of the accident. Petitioner admitted to being the driver of
the vehicle. Deputy Marshall noticed an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the truck
and the Petitioner. Petitioner admitted to drinking and driving, and stated to Officer Marshall, "I
had four beers and I screwed up. I'm just glad I didn't kill my nephew Calvin." Petitioner
admitted to consuming four beers.
2. Deputy Marshall also noticed that Petitioner's speech was slow and his balance was
poor. There was no evidence of any head injuries.
3. Deputy Marshall had Petitioner perform some field sobriety tests. Deputy Marshal
noticed the on set of nystagmus at about 40 degrees and that Petitioner's eyes lacked smooth
pursuit. The result of this test was severely compromised because of Deputy Marshall's failure to
conduct the test as trained. During the one leg stand test, Petitioner only counted to two and then
dropped his leg to the ground. During the walk and turn test, Petitioner didn't walk straight, he
did not touch heal to toe, he stopped the test at step eight and said he could not do the test.
4. Deputy Marshall placed Petitioner under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol and transported him to special operations which took about

OXIQ

hour.

5. During the drive Petitioner engaged Deputy Marshall in a conversation in regards to

2

whether or not he should take the breath test. Deputy Marshal told Petitioner that he could not
advise him on whether or not he should take a breath test. Deputy Marshall told Petitioner that
personally he would not take the test. Deputy Marshall however, explained to Petitioner the
consequences if he refused to take the test numerous times.
6. Once at Special Operations, Deputy Marshall read Petitioner the chemical test
admonitions off of the DUI report form, requested that Petitioner take a breath test, and informed
Petitioner of the consequences of a test result that shows that Petitioner has an unlawful amount
of alcohol, drug or controlled substance in his body. Petitioner responded, "Well, I took no drugs
and I refuse the test."
7. Deputy Marshall then read Petitioner the refusal admonition, which informed
Petitioner that if he refuses the breath test his driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months for
a first refusal or 24 months if it is a second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or
drug related driving offense, with no provision for limited driving. Petitioner refused to take the
breath test.
8. Petitioner was served with a copy of the Driver License Division's notice of intent to
suspend or revoke his license.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1.

Deputy Marshall had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for driving under the
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influence of alcohol. Even if all of the Field sobriety Tests are thrown out there is enough for
probable cause. Petitioner was in an vehicle accident, and he consumed for beers. Petitioner
admitted that "I'm screwed up." Petitioner's speech was slow, and his balance was poor. The
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test was severely compromised. However, the results of the walk
and turn just helps establish probable cause. Failure to say if you put your foot down pick it back
up, does not change the fact that Petitioner could only keep his foot raised for 2 counts.
Petitioner then stated that he could not do the test. Failure to measure the inches that Petitioner
missed heel to toe does not effect the fact that Petitioner didn't finish the tests and stated that he
could not do that test.
2. Petitioner refuse the requested breath test after being informed of the consequences of
the refusal. Deputy Marshall properly read Petitioner the admonitions, then he went above and
beyond in his explanations of the consequences included in the admonitions. Deputy Marshall's
statements regarding his personal opinion did not have any legal effect on Petitioner's refusal to
take the breath test. The pivotal fact in this case is that while Deputy Marshall may have voice
certain personal opinions about taking the breath test himself, he also emphasized the
consequences to the Petitioner if he refused to take the test. Based on the testimony presented at
trial, Petitioner clearly made an informed and voluntary decision to not take the breath test.
3. Petitioner was served with notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or
revoke his license.
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1

Petitioner's Petition is denied.

2. The revocation of Petitioner's driving privilege is upheld
Dated this

day of

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge ^ : "; *.•* ^fr
Approved as to

/ /MMm
Jason Schatz
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED BINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage prepaid, on this
January, 2007, to the following.
Jason Schatz
Schatz & Anderson, LLC
Attorney at Law
356 E. 900 S
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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